The Outer Space Treaty set the foundation. Four more instruments followed to fill in specifics — three became routine, widely ratified plumbing. The fourth, the Moon Agreement, never won over a single major spacefaring nation, and why is a genuinely contested question, not a settled one.
These three treaties fill in operational specifics the Outer Space Treaty left open — and unlike Module 1's principles, there isn't much of a "who benefits" story here. Every spacefaring nation has a practical interest in all three working as intended.
What It Does
Requires states to render assistance to astronauts in distress or accident, and to return both astronauts and recovered space objects to the launching state. Broadly ratified — every spacefaring nation benefits symmetrically from a rule that could someday apply to its own crew.
What It Does
Makes a launching state absolutely liable for damage its space object causes on Earth's surface or to aircraft in flight, and liable based on fault for damage elsewhere. Widely ratified, including all major spacefaring states.
What It Does
Requires states to register the space objects they launch with the United Nations, creating a public record of what's in orbit and who launched it — basic tracking transparency every operator relies on.
In 1978, the Soviet nuclear-powered satellite Kosmos 954 broke up on re-entry and scattered radioactive debris across northern Canada. Canada invoked the Liability Convention's absolute-liability standard, and the USSR paid compensation for the cleanup — a concrete, real-world case of the treaty functioning exactly as written, not just a theoretical framework.
The Rule: The Moon Agreement extends the Moon and other celestial bodies to be the "common heritage of mankind" — going further than the Outer Space Treaty's non-appropriation principle (Module 1) by calling for an international regime to govern any future resource exploitation, with benefits shared equitably among all states, developing nations included.
Who Signed, Who Didn't: Only a small number of states have ever ratified it — and critically, not one major spacefaring nation is among them. Not the US, not Russia (or the USSR before it), not China. A treaty specifically about how to share space resources has essentially no participation from any nation currently capable of extracting any.
Why the major powers stayed away is a real, unresolved dispute — not a question with one agreed answer.
One Reading
"Common heritage" was read as a direct disincentive to investment: no state or company will spend the billions required to extract lunar water ice or asteroid metals if the legal framework requires sharing the proceeds with every non-spacefaring nation on Earth, contributions notwithstanding.
Another Reading
The treaty's failure reflects powerful spacefaring interests choosing to preserve their first-mover advantage rather than a genuine practical objection — the same dynamic Module 1 raised about the original non-appropriation freeze, now applied to why the follow-up treaty that would have closed that gap was quietly abandoned.
Both are live positions in space law scholarship today. This course states them and stops there.
Because the Moon Agreement never took hold, the resource-rights question it tried to settle is still open — which is exactly why the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, the Artemis Accords, and the objections to both need their own dedicated treatment in Module 4.
Treaty texts and ratification status tables from the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, historical documentation on the Kosmos 954 incident and its settlement, and published space law scholarship on the Moon Agreement's non-ratification. This module set should always be checked for current developments before publishing.
Module 3 covers national space law and export control — how ITAR and national licensing regimes shape who can compete in satellite commerce.